But if the existence of a transcendental faculty of freedom is granted- a faculty of originating changes in the world- this faculty must at least exist out of and apart from the world; although it is certainly a bold assumption, that, over and above the complete content of all possible intuitions, there still exists an object which cannot be presented in any possible perception.But, to attribute to substances in the world itself such a faculty, is quite inadmissible; for, in this case; the connection of phenomena reciprocally determining and determined according to general laws, which is termed nature, and along with it the criteria of empirical truth, which enable us to distinguish experience from mere visionary dreaming, would almost entirely disappear.In proximity with such a lawless faculty of freedom, a system of nature is hardly cogitable;for the laws of the latter would be continually subject to the intrusive influences of the former, and the course of phenomena, which would otherwise proceed regularly and uniformly, would become thereby confused and disconnected.
FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.
THESIS.
There exists either in, or in connection with the world- either as a part of it, or as the cause of it-an absolutely necessary being.
PROOF.
The world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena, contains a series of changes.For, without such a series, the mental representation of the series of time itself, as the condition of the possibility of the sensuous world, could not be presented to us.*But every change stands under its condition, which precedes it in time and renders it necessary.Now the existence of a given condition presupposes a complete series of conditions up to the absolutely unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary.It follows that something that is absolutely necessary must exist, if change exists as its consequence.But this necessary thing itself belongs to the sensuous world.For suppose it to exist out of and apart from it, the series of cosmical changes would receive from it a beginning, and yet this necessary cause would not itself belong to the world of sense.But this is impossible.For, as the beginning of a series in time is determined only by that which precedes it in time, the supreme condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the time in which this series itself did not exist; for a beginning supposes a time preceding, in which the thing that begins to be was not in existence.The causality of the necessary cause of changes, and consequently the cause itself, must for these reasons belong to time- and to phenomena, time being possible only as the form of phenomena.Consequently, it cannot be cogitated as separated from the world of sense- the sum total of all phenomena.There is, therefore, contained in the world, something that is absolutely necessary- whether it be the whole cosmical series itself, or only a part of it.
*Objectively, time, as the formal condition of the possibility of change, precedes all changes; but subjectively, and in consciousness, the representation of time, like every other, is given solely by occasion of perception.
ANTITHESIS.
An absolutely necessary being does not exist, either in the world, or out of it- as its cause.
PROOF.
Grant that either the world itself is necessary, or that there is contained in it a necessary existence.Two cases are possible.
First, there must either be in the series of cosmical changes a beginning, which is unconditionally necessary, and therefore uncaused-which is at variance with the dynamical law of the determination of all phenomena in time; or, secondly, the series itself is without beginning, and, although contingent and conditioned in all its parts, is nevertheless absolutely necessary and unconditioned as a whole- which is self-contradictory.For the existence of an aggregate cannot be necessary, if no single part of it possesses necessary existence.
Grant, on the other band, that an absolutely necessary cause exists out of and apart from the world.This cause, as the highest member in the series of the causes of cosmical changes, must originate or begin* the existence of the latter and their series.In this case it must also begin to act, and its causality would therefore belong to time, and consequently to the sum total of phenomena, that is, to the world.It follows that the cause cannot be out of the world; which is contradictory to the hypothesis.Therefore, neither in the world, nor out of it (but in causal connection with it), does there exist any absolutely necessary being.
*The word begin is taken in two senses.The first is active- the cause being regarded as beginning a series of conditions as its effect (infit).The second is passive- the causality in the cause itself beginning to operate (fit).I reason here from the first to the second.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOURTH ANTINOMY.
ON THE THESIS.
To demonstrate the existence of a necessary being, I cannot be permitted in this place to employ any other than the cosmological argument, which ascends from the conditioned in phenomena to the unconditioned in conception- the unconditioned being considered the necessary condition of the absolute totality of the series.The proof, from the mere idea of a supreme being, belongs to another principle of reason and requires separate discussion.
The pure cosmological proof demonstrates the existence of a necessary being, but at the same time leaves it quite unsettled, whether this being is the world itself, or quite distinct from it.
