Let it be supposed that a composite thing (as substance) consists of simple parts.Inasmuch as all external relation, consequently all composition of substances, is possible only in space; the space, occupied by that which is composite, must consist of the same number of parts as is contained in the composite.But space does not consist of simple parts, but of spaces.Therefore, every part of the composite must occupy a space.But the absolutely primary parts of what is composite are simple.It follows that what is simple occupies a space.Now, as everything real that occupies a space, contains a manifold the parts of which are external to each other, and is consequently composite- and a real composite, not of accidents (for these cannot exist external to each other apart from substance), but of substances- it follows that the simple must be a substantial composite, which is self-contradictory.
The second proposition of the antithesis- that there exists in the world nothing that is simple- is here equivalent to the following: The existence of the absolutely simple cannot be demonstrated from any experience or perception either external or internal; and the absolutely simple is a mere idea, the objective reality of which cannot be demonstrated in any possible experience; it is consequently, in the exposition of phenomena, without application and object.For, let us take for granted that an object may be found in experience for this transcendental idea; the empirical intuition of such an object must then be recognized to contain absolutely no manifold with its parts external to each other, and connected into unity.
Now, as we cannot reason from the non-consciousness of such a manifold to the impossibility of its existence in the intuition of an object, and as the proof of this impossibility is necessary for the establishment and proof of absolute simplicity; it follows that this simplicity cannot be inferred from any perception whatever.As, therefore, an absolutely simple object cannot be given in any experience, and the world of sense must be considered as the sum total of all possible experiences: nothing simple exists in the world.
This second proposition in the antithesis has a more extended aim than the first.The first merely banishes the simple from the intuition of the composite; while the second drives it entirely out of nature.Hence we were unable to demonstrate it from the conception of a given object of external intuition (of the composite), but we were obliged to prove it from the relation of a given object to a possible experience in general.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE SECOND ANTINOMY.
THESIS.
When I speak of a whole, which necessarily consists of simple parts, I understand thereby only a substantial whole, as the true composite; that is to say, I understand that contingent unity of the manifold which is given as perfectly isolated (at least in thought), placed in reciprocal connection, and thus constituted a unity.Space ought not to be called a compositum but a totum, for its parts are possible in the whole, and not the whole by means of the parts.It might perhaps be called a compositum ideale, but not a compositum reale.But this is of no importance.As space is not a composite of substances (and not even of real accidents), if I abstract all composition therein- nothing, not even a point, remains; for a point is possible only as the limit of a space- consequently of a composite.
Space and time, therefore, do not consist of simple parts.That which belongs only to the condition or state of a substance, even although it possesses a quantity (motion or change, for example), likewise does not consist of simple parts.That is to say, a certain degree of change does not originate from the addition of many simple changes.Our inference of the simple from the composite is valid only of self-subsisting things.But the accidents of a state are not self-subsistent.The proof, then, for the necessity of the simple, as the component part of all that is substantial and composite, may prove a failure, and the whole case of this thesis be lost, if we carry the proposition too far, and wish to make it valid of everything that is composite without distinction- as indeed has really now and then happened.Besides, I am here speaking only of the simple, in so far as it is necessarily given in the composite- the latter being capable of solution into the former as its component parts.The proper signification of the word monas (as employed by Leibnitz) ought to relate to the simple, given immediately as simple substance (for example, in consciousness), and not as an element of the composite.As an clement, the term atomus would be more appropriate.And as I wish to prove the existence of simple substances, only in relation to, and as the elements of, the composite, I might term the antithesis of the second Antinomy, transcendental Atomistic.But as this word has long been employed to designate a particular theory of corporeal phenomena (moleculae), and thus presupposes a basis of empirical conceptions, I prefer calling it the dialectical principle of Monadology.
ANTITHESIS.
