We shall carry this proposition yet a step farther.We shall venture to propose,that pain and pleasure are not only not necessarily dependent for their existence on their mutual diminution or removal,but that,in reality,the diminution or ceasing of pleasure does not operate like positive pain;
and that the removal or diminution of pain,in its effect,has very little resemblance to positive pleasure.1The former of these propositions will,I believe,be much more readily allowed than the latter;because it is very evident that pleasure,when it has run its career,sets us down very nearly where it found us.
Pleasure of every kind quickly satisfies;and when it is over,we relapse into indifference,or rather we fall into a soft tranquillity,which is tinged with the agreeable colour of the former sensation.I own it is not at first view so apparent,that the removal of a great pain does not resemble positive pleasure;but let us recollect in what state we have found our minds upon escaping some imminent danger,or on being released from the severity of some cruel pain.We have on such occasions found,if I am not much mistaken,the temper of our minds in a tenor very remote from that which attends the presence of positive pleasure;we have found them in a state of much sobriety,impressed with a sense of awe,in a sort of tranquillity shadowed with horror.The fashion of the countenance and the gesture of the body on such occasions is so correspondent to this state of mind,that any person,a stranger to the cause of the appearance,would rather judge us under some consternation,than in the enjoyment of anything like positive pleasure.
'Ms d'or "av avdp'"arn nuklvn'XaBn,"obr''evl'narpn pwra karakteivas,"aXXwv eEiketo dnmov,'Avodpbs es apvelou,OamBos d exel eiboPowvras.Iliad.M.480.
As when a wretch,who,conscious of his crime,Pursued for murder from his native clime,Just gains some frontier,breathless,pale,amazed;All gaze,all wonder!
This striking appearance of the man whom Homer supposes to have just escaped an imminent danger,the sort of mixed passion of terror and surprise,with which he affects the spectators,paints very strongly the manner in which we find ourselves affected upon occasions any way similar.For when we have suffered from any violent emotion,the mind naturally continues in something like the same condition,after the cause which first produced it has ceased to operate.The tossing of the sea remains after the storm;
and when this remain of horror has entirely subsided,all the passion,which the accident raised,subsides along with it;and the mind returns to its usual state of indifference.In short,pleasure (I mean anything either in the inward sensation,or in the outward appearance,like pleasure from a positive cause)
has never,I imagine,its origin from the removal of pain or danger.
IV
Of Delight And Pleasure As Opposed To Each Other But shall we therefore say,that the removal of pain or its diminution is always simply painful?or affirm that the cessation or the lessening of pleasure is always attended itself with a pleasure?By no means.What I advance is no more than this;first,that there are pleasures and pains of a positive and independent nature;and,secondly,that the feeling which results from the ceasing or diminution of pain does not bear a sufficient resemblance to positive pleasure,to have it considered as of the same nature,or to entitle it to be known by the same name;and,thirdly,that upon the same principle the removal or qualification of pleasure has no resemblance to positive pain.It is certain that the former feeling (the removal or moderation of pain)
has something in it far from distressing or disagreeable in its nature.
This feeling,in many cases so agreeable,but in all so different from positive pleasure,has no name which I know;but that hinders not its being a very real one,and very different from all others.It is most certain that every species of satisfaction or pleasure,how different soever in its manner of affecting,is of a positive nature in the mind of him who feels it.The affection is undoubtedly positive;
but the cause may be,as in this case it certainly is,a sort of Privation.
And it is very reasonable that we should distinguish by some term two things so distinct in nature,as a pleasure that is such simply,and without any relation,from that pleasure which cannot exist without a relation,and that too a relation to pain.
Very extraordinary it would be,if these affections,so distinguishable in their causes,so different in their effects,should be confounded with each other,because vulgar use has ranged them under the same general title.Whenever I
have occasion to speak of this species of relative pleasure,I call it Delight;
and I shall take the best care I can to use that word in no other sense.
I am satisfied the word is not commonly used in this appropriated signification;
